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A Free Press: The Forgotten Issue in Home
Placement v. Providence Journal
I. INTRODUCTION
The first amendment guarantees freedom of speech and of
the press." Justice Cardozo described these as the freedoms upon
which nearly all of our liberties are based,2 a view supported by
the elevated position accorded free speech throughout our his-
tory. The rights created are not absolute-government interests
in regulating nonspeech activity may prevail in certain well-
defined instances-but neither are they easily put aside. When
the government interest is in enforcing the Sherman Antitrust
Act,3 a number of special difficulties arise. Congress provided
treble damages4 and injunctive relief s to ensure the effectiveness
of the Act. Yet these sanctions could have a devastating effect
on free speech if used to regulate the content of a newspaper.
The Supreme Court has avoided this constitutional dilemma by
only applying the Sherman Act to the business side of a newspa-
per; the content or editorial side has been left alone. Nowhere is
this line between protected speech and unprotected commercial
activity more difficult to discern than in the classified advertise-
ments. A court required to make these distinctions should do so
with sensitivity to the first amendment interests which adhere
whenever the content of a newspaper is involved. Core first
1. The first amendment reads in full: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
3. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976), is used generically in this Note to
denote antitrust law in general.
4. "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor. . . and shall recover threefold
the damages by him sustained .... ." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
5. "Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have
injunctive relief... against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust
laws ...." 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976).
6. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1945) (membership rules
of the Associated Press limiting dispersal of news held to be in restraint of trade);
accord, Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969) (joint operating
agreement which provided for price fixing, profit pooling, and market control held in
violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act).
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amendment rights are no less important because they are exer-
cised through editorial control of the classified advertisements.
Only the most compelling of state interests can overbalance
their free exercise.7
Home Placement Service, Inc. v. Providence Journal Co.'
involved a private antitrust action brought against a newspaper
to compel the publication of proffered advertisements. The First
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court decisions
and held that the newspaper had violated sections one1" and
two" of the Sherman Act. Since Senior Circuit Judge Aldrich's
opinion never mentioned free speech, free press, or the first
amendment, the implication is that, in the court's view, first
amendment issues were not present.
This Note will demonstrate that the court's decision in
Home Placement did infringe upon protected first amendment
activity. Since free speech and free press guarantees were
threatened by the government's action, the court should have
balanced the competing interests and held in favor of Home
Placement only upon a showing of a compelling state interest.
After examining the interests of the advertiser, the reader, the
government, and the newspaper, this Note concludes that the
newspaper's right to control its message and to make editorial
decisions free from the threat of governmental interference over-
balance the antitrust claim made in this case. A Sherman Act
claim should not be upheld where the anticompetitive effect is
the unintended result of the exercise of protected speech activ-
ity. A contrary result would elevate antitrust law at the denigra-
tion of constitutional rights.
Home Placement arose out of a dispute between a Rhode
7. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958) (state must demonstrate a
compelling interest before it can require an association to disclose membership lists
when disclosure entails a substantial likelihood of restraining the exercise of associa-
tional rights).
8. Home Placement Service, Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., 682 F.2d 274 (1st Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3650 (U.S. Mar. 8, 1983) (No. 82-227).
9. Home Placement Service, Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., No. 77-158, slip op.
(D.R.I. Sept. 24, 1981).
10. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
11. "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
felony . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
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Island newspaper and a rental listing service. The Providence
Journal is the sole daily newspaper in its market.12 Its print
competition comes from suburban daily and weekly newspa-
pers.18 Home Placement sold lists of rental housing to prospec-
tive renters."' It attracted customers by placing advertisements
for specific homes in the newspaper's classified section.' 5 When a
reader responded to the advertisements he was encouraged to
purchase the full list. Only then would the service release addi-
tional information about the house.' In response to an earlier
experience with another rental listing service,'7 the Journal had
formulated a policy of rejecting advertisements from advertisers
who charged the reader a fee before releasing additional infor-
mation about the advertised property. When the Journal discov-
ered that Home Placement charged such a fee, it refused to
accept additional advertisements. Home Placement then
removed the fee and the Journal accepted several advertise-
ments.'" Shortly thereafter, however, Home Placement ceased
doing business and filed suit.'"
12. Home Placement, 682 F.2d at 280.
13. Id. at 280. For the purposes of this case, the relevant product was limited to
daily newspaper rental advertising. Because electronic media do not carry this product
they were not considered competitors in the market.
14. Id. at 276.
15. Typical of the advertisements placed in the Journal by Home Placement was
this: "SLOCUM: New duplexes, two bedrooms, 1V, baths, carpeted, built-in, $250 a
month, lease. Home Placement. 828-9020." Petition For a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit at 8 n.4, Home Placement Service,
Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., 682 F.2d 274 (1st Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Petition
for Writ].
16. Home Placement, 682 F.2d at 276.
17. This service, doing business as Homefinders of America, Inc., placed advertise-
ments in the newspaper for highly desirable homes at attractive rates. Upon investiga-
tion, these homes were never available. Renters were instead encouraged to purchase the
rental list. These homes in turn were often not for rent, not of the same character as the
advertised home, or had been listed without the landlord's permission. Some simply did
not exist. Home Placement, 682 F.2d at 276. In response to what it described as a "tor-
rent" of complaints, the Journal instituted its policy of rejecting this type of
advertisement.
The Journal's problems with Homefinders resulted in two cases upholding the list-
ing service policy. Walker v. Providence Journal Co., 493 F.2d 82 (1st Cir. 1974) and
Homefinders of America, Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., 621 F.2d 441 (1st Cir. 1980).
The parties in the present case, Home Placement, agreed that the record of these two
cases could be considered for all purposes in Home Placement with the additional fact
that Home Placement had no record of fraudulent practice. Home Placement v. Provi-
dence Journal, No. 77-158, slip op. (D.R.I. Sept. 24, 1981).
18. Home Placement, 682 F.2d at 279.
19. Petition for Writ, supra note 15 at 8-9.
214 University of Puget Sound Law Review
The Journal believed that Home Placement's style of
advertising was inherently misleading. It argued that Home
Placement's scheme was a classic bait and switch: the objective
was to sell rental lists and the bait was the advertisement for a
single home. The reader, expecting to speak with someone
authorized to rent the house, was instead put in contact with
someone whose sole objective was to sell him a different prod-
uct.2 0 The Journal felt that this practice was inconsistent with
the expectations of its readers and its advertisers.2 As a result,
it decided not to print this type of advertisement.
Home Placement argued that the Journal's policy violated
section two of the Sherman Act, and that the Journal's refusal
to accept the advertisements, coupled with Home Placement's
subsequent removal of the fee, amounted to a conspiracy in
restraint of trade in violation of section one. The District Court
rejected both claims.22 The Court of Appeals reversed, finding
violations of sections one and two.
2'
Judge Aldrich held that the Journal's refusal to print was
an unreasonable business decision. Home Placement was a new
company with no history of deceptive practice. Its method of
advertising was not "inherently and unfailingly deceptive,"2 nor
was fraudulent practice shown. Until Home Placement actually
succumbed to deceptive practice, the Court ruled that the Jour-
nal's policy could not be applied to it.' 5 In contrast to the Dis-
trict Court, Judge Aldrich found that the facts plainly indicated
monopoly power.2 6 The parties were competitors because a
rental listing service could conceivably draw advertising away
from the newspaper.27 Intent to exclude competition was irrele-
vant.2 8 It was sufficient that the Journal's action, taken for
20. Home Placement, No. 77-158, slip op. (D.R.I. Sept. 24, 1981).
21. Home Placement, 682 F.2d at 277 n.4.
22. See supra note 20.
23. Home Placement, 682 F.2d at 274.
24. Id. at 277.
25. The Circuit Court rejected the Journal's view that this type of advertising was
inherently deceptive merely because the item advertised was not the principal item to be
sold. See supra text accompanying notes 20-23. Instead, the decision characterized the
practice as more akin to the common practice of advertising loss leaders. Home Place-
ment, 682 F.2d at 277.
26. Home Placement, 682 F.2d at 279. The exact scope of the monopoly was unim-
portant; it was enough that the Journal had the apparent power to raise prices and
exclude competition. Id.
27. Id. at 281.
28. Specific intent is only required for attempt to monopolize. Id. at 281.
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whatever reason, had the effect of excluding competition.2 9
The Court of Appeals also accepted Home Placement's
argument that the Journal's refusal to accept the advertise-
ments with a fee, and Home Placement's subsequent removal of
the fee, amounted to a conspiracy in restraint of trade.3 0 The
combination fixed a price of zero for Home Placement's sale of
rental information. The newspaper's refusal was a unilateral
action, but the refusal, the removal of the fee, and the conse-
quent acceptance of the advertising formed a conspiracy in vio-
lation of section one.31
As noted previously, the Court's opinion was notably void of
first amendment analysis. The right of a newspaper to refuse
advertising was limited by the court to the common law right of
any business to choose with whom it will deal. In fact, the scope
of this right has been sufficient in most cases to protect a news-
paper's interests.3 2 The exception to the common law rule is that
the refusal cannot further an illegal monopoly. 3 The First Cir-
cuit held that the Journal's refusal fell within the exception.
The court's mistake, however, was in assuming that its analysis
29. Id.
30. Id. at 279.
31. Id.
32. The court cited a single case, PMP Assocs. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 366 Mass.
593, 321 N.E.2d 915 (1975), to substantiate what it described as the presumptive right of
a newspaper to choose which advertising or type of advertising it will carry. In fact the
weight of this authority is rather more substantial. See Associates & Aldrich Co. v.
Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971); Chicago Joint Board, Amalgamated
Clothing Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 973 (1971); Staff Research Assocs. v. Tribune Co., 346 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1965);
Person v. New York Post Corp., 427 F. Supp. 1297 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), af'd mem., 573 F.2d
1294 (2d Cir. 1977); In re Wohl, Inc., 50 F.2d 254 (E.D. Mich. 1931); Carpets by the
Carload, Inc. v. Warren, 368 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Wis. 1973); America's Best Cinema
Corp. v. Ft. Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 328 (N.D. Ind. 1972); Approved Per-
sonnel, Inc. v. Tribune Co. 177 So. 2d 704 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Shuck v. Carroll
Daily Herald, 215 Iowa 1276, 247 N.W. 813 (1933); Bloss v. Federated Publications, Inc.,
380 Mich. 485, 157 N.W.2d 241 (1968), affg 5 Mich. App. 74, 145 N.W.2d 800 (1966);
Poughkeepsie Buying Service, Inc. v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc., 205 Misc. 982, 131
N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954); Mack v. Costello, 32 S.D. 511, 143 N.W. 950 (1913);
Newspaper Printing Corp. v. Galbreath, 580 S.W.2d 777 (Tenn. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 870 (1979); Wisconsin Ass'n. of Nursing Homes v. Journal Co., 92 Wis. 2d 709, 285
N.W.2d 891 (1979). As interpreted by the courts, this doctrine generally provides that no
reason for the refusal to deal need be given. It may be the result of caprice or whim. It
makes no difference that the advertiser needs access to the newspaper's advertising space
to survive, nor is it affected by the virtual monopoly position of many major newspapers.
The exception is that the refusal cannot further an illegal monopoly. See infra note 33.
33. See Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) and Kansas City
Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957).
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was complete.
A. The First Amendment Rights of the Advertiser
With certain well established exceptions, the Supreme
Court has recognized that an advertiser has a first amendment
right to disseminate his message.' If his message is political or,
as it is sometimes described, "public," he enjoys the same degree
of protection as any other speaker.8 5 If his message is "commer-
cial," his protection is somewhat less."' Until 1975, commercial
speech was considered to be outside the first amendment.
3 7
34. Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York,
447 U.S. 557 (1980). In Central Hudson the Court struck down a regulatory ban on pro-
motional advertising by electric utilities and enunciated a four-part test for analyzing
commercial speech problems:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the
First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at
least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether
the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield posi-
tive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest.
Id. at 566. Although this test is essentially a strict scrutiny analysis, it is tempered by the
lesser level of importance accorded to commercial speech. See infra note 36.
35. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), involved an "editorial
advertisement" attacking the "wave of terror" which met Negro students demonstrating
for their rights at Alabama State College in Montgomery. The Supreme Court rejected
the plaintiff's argument that a paid commercial advertisement deserved no constitutional
protection:
It communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested
claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose
existance and objectives are matters of the highest public concern.... [To
deny the advertisement protection] would be to shackle the First Amendment
in its attempt to secure "the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources."
Id. at 266 (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
36. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562. "[O]ur decisions have recognized 'the "com-
monsense" distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs
in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of
speech."' Id. (citing Ohralick v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978). In a
footnote the majority elaborated further.
This Court's decisions on commercial expression have rested on the premise
that such speech, although meriting some protection, is of less constitutional
moment than other forms of speech. As we stated in Ohralik, the failure to
distinguish between commercial and noncommercial speech "could invite dilu-
tion, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the [First] Amendment's
guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech."
Id. at 562 n.5.
37. The first commercial speech doctrine originated with Valentine v. Chrestensen,
316 U.S. 52 (1942). In Chresteneen, the Court ruled that the distribution of "purely com-
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Along with certain other categories of speech-fighting words,8s
obscenity, 89 shouting fire in a theatre 4-commercial speech was
thought too removed from the quest for truth to deserve first
amendment protection. 41 Beginning with Bigelow v. Virginia4 2
and Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc.,'" a new commercial speech doctrine
evolved. It recognized that, although speech might relate to
products or services, it could be a valuable part of the market-
place of ideas." Even a purely commercial message can be help-
ful in making many of the daily decisions of life. 5 On the other
hand, the Court has noted that commercial speech is "hardier"
than classic public speech.46 As such, it needs fewer protections
to assure its place in the market, and, since there is an economic
incentive behind the message, it is more likely to find an alter-
native medium if one is foreclosed.'7
As with all first amendment rights, the advertiser's protec-
tion for his commercial message is only secured against govern-
ment action.4' He has no first amendment rights against private
parties." For an advertiser to claim that a newspaper's refusal to
mercial advertising" could be regulated. Id. at 54. In later cases it was often cited as
holding that commercial speech was entitled to no first amendment protection at all.
38. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
39. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
40. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
41. As a rule, it does not affect the political process, does not contribute to the
exchange of ideas, does not provide information on matters of public impor-
tance, and is not, except perhaps for the ad-men, a form of individual self-
expression. It is rather a form of merchandising subject to limitation for public
purposes like other business practices.
Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1101-02 (1968).
42. 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (conviction of an editor for publishing an advertisement for
an abortion referral agency violated the first amendment).
43. 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (ban on price advertising by pharmacists violated first
amendment rights of the speaker and the recipient).
44. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 826.
45. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765.
46. Id. at 771-72 n.24.
47. Id.
48. Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461 (1952) (the first amend-
ment restricts the federal government, not private persons). It should be noted that as
the antitrust claim derives from federal law there is no question of "state" action under
the 14th amendment.
49. But see, Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARv.
L. REv. 1641 (1967); Barron, An Emerging First Amendment Right of Access to the
Media?, 37 GEO. WASH. L. Rev. 487 (1969); J. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR
WHOM? (1973). Prof. Barron is a leading advocate of a first amendment right of access to
the press. His theories are based largely on the expansive language of Red Lion Broad-
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deal violated his first amendment rights, he would have to prove
that the refusal involved some cognizable form of state action.50
A number of advertisers have attempted to prove state action
without success.01 State action exists only when one is "clothed
with the authority of the state and. . . purporting to act there-
under. '0 2 As the history of the state and the press is of disassoci-
ation, 3 it is difficult to prove that they act as one. In fact, state
action by a newspaper has never been found absent actual state
ownership.4 Thus an advertiser has no first amendment right to
have his advertisement printed in a newspaper.0 His right to
casting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969), see infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text,
and were dealt a mortal blow by the Court in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241 (1974). Although Prof. Barron has a great deal to say about who should
benefit from the first amendment, he has very little to say about state action. He seems
to believe that it is an archaic doctrine which has outlived its usefulness.
50. Chicago Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Chicago
Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971). See infra
note 51.
51. Id.; Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133 (1971). In Chi-
cago Joint Board v. Chicago Tribune, a trade union sought to force the Tribune to print
a union advertisement. The union had been picketing a number of large department
stores to protest the importation of foreign clothing. All four of Chicago's major newspa-
pers refused to carry the advertisement. The union alleged state action arguing that the
"special relationship" between the newspapers and the State, arising out of certain statu-
tory provisions which conferred an economic benefit upon the newspapers, amounted to
"state involvement" in the operation of the newspapers. The court did not accept this
argument. "[T]he function of the press from the days the Constitution was written to the
present time has never been conceived as anything but a private enterprise, free and
independent of government control and supervision." Chicago Joint Board, 435 F.2d at
474. In Associates & Aldrich, a motion picture producer sought to enjoin the Los Angeles
Times from "screening, censoring or otherwise changing" his motion picture advertise-
ments, in particular his advertisement for the film, "The Killing of Sister George." 440
F.2d at 133-34. The Times had a screening code for advertisements which listed guide-
lines for such things as "bust measurements" and "vulgar displays of anatomy." The
newspaper had insisted on changes before it would run the advertisement. The plaintiff
argued that this constituted state action. Instead of pointing to preferential treatment by
the government as the union had in Chicago Joint Board, the plaintiff here argued that
state action arose out of the monopoly position of the Times in southern California and
its quasi-public position. The court was unpersuaded and rejected plaintiff's claim. 440
F.2d at 135-36.
52. Marshall v. Sawyer, 301 F.2d 639, 646 (9th Cir. 1961).
53. Chicago Joint Board, 435 F.2d at 474.
54. See Lee v. Board of Regents, 441 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1971) (campus newspaper
conceded to be a state facility); Radical Lawyers Caucus v. Pool, 324 F. Supp. 268 (W.D.
Tex. 1970) (refusal of proffered advertisement by the Texas Bar Journal, an official state
publication, amounted to state censorship of speech); Zucher v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (high school newspaper held to be a public forum for certain purposes);
Portland Women's Health Center v. Portland Community College (Civil Action No. 80-
558) (D.Or Sept. 4, 1981) (state college newspaper held to be a public forum).
55. Chicago Joint Board, 435 F.2d at 478.
Forgotten Free Press
speech is not enforceable against the private press.
Home Placement did have a right not to have its message
refused in restraint of trade." Antitrust claims have been upheld
in cases involving a newspaper's refusal to deal.57 The Supreme
Court has refused to accept the first amendment as an absolute
bar to these claims. It has even noted that at times antitrust and
first amendment concerns may coincide."' But it is important to
distinguish the two.
The Sherman Act was not designed as a vehicle for reaching
first amendment values. Congress created a means of regulating
large aggregations of economic power."e The sanctions built into
antitrust law were meant to assure compliance, but their poten-
tial for chilling speech in the process is immense."° The editor
who prints possibly prohibited speech risks treble damages and
extensive court interference through the injunctive process. Only
the most principled or the most foolhardy would ignore such a
threat. Moreover, the Sherman Act is predicated upon the need
for government intervention in the marketplace. Yet the first
amendment is above all a restriction on government action. The
Sherman Act casts government in a role never contemplated for
it by the framers of the first amendment." As a weapon to cure
the worst excesses of anticompetitive fervor in the press, anti-
trust law might act in concert with free speech interests. But
when it is used to regulate the content of a newspaper-to actu-
ally overturn editorial decisions-it is no longer a friend to free
speech. It is a foe."
56. See solpra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
57. See supra note 33.
58. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1944). See infra note 84.
59. Cf. Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S.
127 (1961). "The proscriptions of the Act, tailored as they are for the business world, are
not at all appropriate for application in the political arena." Id. at 141.
60. See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
61. See infra note 70.
62. See generally, Z. CHAPEE, GovumsNT AND MASS COMMUNICAmONS 537 (1965).
Chafee recognized that the enforcement of antitrust legislation was one of the most
important and difficult problems facing the modern preq.
As yet the Antitrust Laws have not interfered with the freedom of newspapers
to say what they please. Still, it is an odd fact that the recent enormous growth
of the media of communications has called into play a method of legal control
which might be as effective as the censorship. The Antitrust Laws are far more
drastic in their potentialities than the sporadic prosecutions of eighteenth-cen-
tury England. The size of newspapers has made them weaker as against the
government. In more ways than one, concentration of power in the press
endangers its freedom.
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B. The First Amendment Interests of the Reader
Some justifications for the preferred status of the first
amendment stress the right to individual self-expression.e"
Others emphasize the public's right to know-to receive the
messages." In truth, there is value in both; one could not exist
without the other. It would be idle to exalt the reader's interest
in receiving a message apart from the speaker's interest in
expressing it. If the right to express an idea is limited, the
reader's right to receive it is necessarily lessened. The reader is
denied the opportunity to evaluate the message for himself and
to use it in comparison to other ideas he may receive. Protection
for the expression of ideas preserves the public's right to hear
those messages expressed.65
The Supreme Court has traditionally theorized that the first
amendment guarantees a free marketplace of ideas, where truth
and falsehood are free to grapple." In New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, the Court spoke of a profound national commitment
that debate should be "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.
1
The Court's concerns here can be evaluated from both a quanti-
tative and a qualitative point of view. Quantitatively, the first
amendment seeks a broad range of inputs. Even a falsehood
adds to the market under this view because it makes the truth
stand out in bold relief.6e Analyzed on this level, the reader
Id. at 674. Chafee concluded that "sparing" use of antitrust law to attack the "glaring
tendancies toward monopoly" should continue, yet he hoped that antitrust law would
never be applied against content. Id.
63. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), rev'd sub nom, Brandenburg v. Ohio.
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (Brandeis, J. concurring). "Those who won our independence
believed that the final end of the state was to make men free to develop their facul-
ties. . . ." 274 U.S. at 375.
64. "[T]he First Amendment serves to ensure that the individual citizen can effec-
tively participate in and contribute to our republican system of self-government." Globe
Newspaper v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. 2613, 2619 (1982). "Those guarantees [of a free
press] are not for the benefit of the press so much as for the 'benefit of us all.'" Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967).
65. "A broadly defined freedom of the press assures the maintenance of our political
system and an open society." Time v. Hill, 385 U.S. at 389.
66. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J. dissenting). "[Tihe
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market. . . ." Id. at 630.
67. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
68. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 n.19 (citing J.S. MILL, ON LImERTY
(1947)). The concept here is that the marketplace will take care of itself. As Justice
Brandeis wrote in Whitney, "the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced
silence." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. at 377. In a footnote, Brandeis quoted Thomas
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would seemingly benefit only if Home Placement's advertise-
ment were printed. No advertisement means no information and
no benefit. Yet, the Sullivan Court was clearly concerned with
the functioning of the marketplace. The falsehoods contained in
the Times advertisement did not have any constitutional value
in themselves. 9 The Court protected these falsehoods because of
the ill-effect state action against the speaker would have on the
vigor of the marketplace. Thus, it is appropriate to ask whether
compelling the Journal to print a message that its editors
refused would have a similar deleterious effect on the market.
When government compels the publication of a message, it
is assuming a role specifically denied it by the first amend-
ment.70 A number of consequences flow from this action which
may affect the quality of speech available to the public. First, it
immediately undermines the trustworthiness of the information
itself. The greater the role played by government in the market,
the more suspect is the information in the market that may be
of self interest to government. The assumption here is that gov-
ernment would allow only self-serving statements. As noted by
Justice Douglas, "The dominant purpose of the First Amend-
ment was to prohibit the widespread practice of government
suppression of embarassing information. 7 1 It is the press' role
to uncover and publish that information: to act as a check on
Jefferson, "We have nothing to fear from the demoralizing reasonings of some, if others
are left free to demonstrate their errors, and especially when the law stands ready to
punish the first criminal act produced by the false reasoning; these are safer corrections
than the conscience of the judge." Id. at 372 n.3.
69. New York Times v. Sullivan involved a libel action by a public official brought
against the New York Times for a paid advertisement attacking police treatment of
black students protesting segregation. Some of the statements made in the advertise-
ment were admittedly false. Id. at 258.
To persuade others to his own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times,
resorts to exaggeration. . . and even to false statement. But the people of this
nation have ordained in the light of history, that . . . these liberties are, in the
long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the
citizens of a democracy.
Id. at 271 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)).
70. Cf. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (Jackson, J. concurring).
The very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority from
assuming a guardianship of the public mind through regulating the press,
speech, and religion. In this field every person must be his own watchman for
truth, because the forefathers did not trust any government to separate the
true from the false for us.
Id. at 545.
71. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 723-24 (1971) (Douglas, J.
concurring).
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government misconduct.72 To the extent that the government
can control the flow of information through the press, press
independence, and hence its value to the public, is undermined.
That independence can be compromised through government
interference with editorial decisions concerning advertising as
well as news."
The second problem concerns the chilling effect on free
speech. Editors may steer so wide of the possibly offending
activity that protected speech will be compromised.7' In a situa-
tion such as exists in Home Placement, editors could either
exclude all advertisements (an unlikely response) or accept eve-
rything and relinquish editorial control of their advertising. The
Supreme Court has specifically recognized editorial discretion as
a protected speech activity.75 When editors stop functioning as
72. By offering such protection, the First Amendment serves to ensure that the
individual citizen can effectively participate in and contribute to our republi-
can system of self-government. . . . Thus to the extent that the First Amend-
ment embraces a right of access to criminal trials, it is to ensure that this con-
stitutionally protected "discussion of governmental affairs" is an informed
one. . . . [I~n the broadest terms, public access to criminal trials permits the
public to participate in and serve as a check upon the judicial process-an
essential component in our structure of self-government.
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. 2613, 2619-20 (1982). See generally,
Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 3 A.B.F. RES. J. 521 (1977).
73. See supra note 37. But cf., Note, Regulation of Commercial Speech: Commer-
cial Access to the Newspapers, 35 MD. L. REv. 115, 124 (1975) (argues that editorial
discretion concerning advertising should receive no more protection than the advertising
itself).
74. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his
factual assertions-and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited
in amount-leads to . . . "self censorship." Allowance of the defense of truth,
with the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false
speech will be deterred .... Under such a rule, would-be critics of official con-
duct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to
be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be
proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so. They tend to make
only statements which "steer far wider of the unlawful zone." [citation omit-
ted] The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate.
Id. at 279.
75. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). Tornillo con-
cerned the constitutionality of a right of reply statute. The case arose when a political
candidate demanded that the Miami Herald publish his reply to an editorial attacking
his candidacy as required by Florida statute. The Supreme Court reversed the Florida
decision on two grounds: 1) it exacted a penalty based on the content of a newspaper,
and 2) it intruded into the function of editors.
We see that beginning with Associated Press. . . the Court has expressed sen-
sitivity as to whether a restriction or requirement constituted the compulsion
exerted by government on a newspaper to print that which it would not other-
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editors, speech is chilled.
The public is not served by a system in which government
makes decisions properly left to editors. The interests of the
reader are better served by respecting the integrity of the press
than by compelling publication of these advertisements. The
benefit would be more than offset by the loss.
C. The Government's Interest
The government's interest in this case is limited to enforce-
ment of the Sherman Act. It has no first amendment interest of
its own nor does it have an affirmative first amendment role to
play. Critics have argued that such a role exists under Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C.,7 but the Red Lion doctrine has
never been applied to print media and, in truth, has not evolved
within broadcasting as some may have wished. 78
The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the first
amendment as prohibiting government from regulating the con-
tent of speech.79 To be sure, certain categories of ideas are con-
sidered to be without first amendment protection precisely
because of their content.80 But within the realm of protected
wise print. The clear implication has been that any such compulsion to publish
that which "'reason' tells them should not be published" is unconstitutional.
Id. at 256. See also infra note 105.
76. "[I]t is not the right . ..of the state to protect the public against false doc-
trine." Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. at 545 (Jackson, J., concurring).
77. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See infra note 78.
78. See supra note 49. Red Lion upheld the limited right of access to the airwaves
created by the FCC's Fairness Doctrine and its right of reply rules. The importance of
the decision lies in the expansive language used by the court. It emphasized the first
amendment rights of the public and the interests of those speakers who could not use
the airwaves without government assistance. The first amendment rights of the broad-
casters were relegated to a secondary position. Although it has been argued otherwise,
Red Lion is clearly a broadcast case. It is predicated on the unique characteristics of that
medium: the finite nature of the airwaves, and the public ownership thereof. While
arguably limited access exists in both broadcasting and print, the limitation in broad-
casting concerns a public resource, not private printing presses. This essential difference
has led to a variety of regulations in broadcasting which would never pass constitutional
muster if applied to print.
79. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (right of reply
statute struck down as it interfered with the rights of editors to control content); Police
Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (regulation restricting picketing
near school to labor disputes violated requirement of government neutrality concerning
content); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (usual rule is that government may not
prescribe the form or content of individual expression).
80. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
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speech, government regulations must be content neutral.81
Despite seemingly reasonable purposes for governmental regula-
tion of speech, the courts have consistently upheld the first
amendment rights of individuals and the press to choose the
content of their messages. 2 It is not the role of the state to
choose among the messages that will enter the market."s
Limiting the governmental interest to the enforcement of
antitrust law does not preordain that the newspaper's first
amendment rights will prevail. In Associated Press v. United
States, the Court refused to recognize the first amendment as an
absolute bar to the application of antitrust law." The courts
81. But see Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (zoning ordinance
aimed at adult theaters does not violate first amendment although it makes a classifica-
tion based on the content of speech); cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978)
(broadcast of "dirty words" could be restricted although words were not obscene).
82. Gore Newspapers Co. v. Shevin, 397 F. Supp. 1253, 1257 (1975). "However com-
mendable the purpose in the exercise of the police power by various legislatures, the
Supreme Court has consistently struck down statutes which restrain the content of
publication."
83. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269. "The First Amendment, said
Judge Learned Hand, 'presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered
out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many
this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all.'" Id. at 270 (citing
United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)). But see, Pitts-
burgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973). The
leading case on state regulation of advertising, Pittsburgh Press was decided shortly
before the advent of the new commercial speech doctrine. See supra notes 32-47 and
accompanying text. At issue was a city ordinance forbidding the use of sex-designated
columns in the help wanted section of a newspaper. The Press argued that the ordinance
violated its editorial discretion and hence its constitutional rights. The Court rejected
this argument for two reasons: 1) the advertisement and its placement were commercial
speech unprotected (at that time) under Chrestensen, and 2) the commercial activity
proscribed was illegal. Although the opinion itself seemed to emphasize the unprotected
nature of the speech, the case is most often cited because of the illegal activity rationale.
See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
84. 326 U.S. 1 (1944). Associated Press involved an antitrust suit brought against
the AP because of its restrictive membership rules. The competitive advantages of mem-
bership were so great that it was difficult for a newspaper to survive financially without
it. In defense, the AP argued that the first amendment shielded the organization from
antitrust law. This argument was soundly rejected:
The First Amendment, far from providing an argument against application of
the Sherman Act, here provides powerful reasons to the contrary. That
Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of
the public, that a free press is a condition of a free society. Surely a command
that the government itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas does not
afford non-governmental combinations a refuge if they impose restraints upon
that constitutionally guaranteed freedom. Freedom to publish means freedom
for all and not for some.
Id. at 20.
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have consistently interpreted Associated Press, however, as
applying only to the business or commercial functions of a news-
paper.8 5 Any incursion into the area of content encounters much
more substantial first amendment difficulties.86 The Court itself
was careful to note that Associated Press was not a compulsion
to print case. "The decree does not compel AP or its members to
permit publication of anything which their 'reason' tells them
should not be published. It only provides that after their reason
has permitted publication of news, they shall not, for their own
financial advantage, unlawfully combine to limit its
publication. 8 7
Seven years after Associated Press, in Lorain Journal Co. v.
United States, 8 the Supreme Court decided an antitrust case
which did result in a court order compelling the publication of
advertisements. This case was not inconsistent, however, with
Associated Press. The Lorain Journal was refusing to accept
advertisements from businesses which advertised on a local
radio station. The admitted purpose of this action was to
exclude the radio station from the Lorain advertising market.
The Lorain Journal neither claimed that it was trying to pre-
sent a message through its advertising policy nor that it exer-
cised editorial judgment in excluding advertisers.89 In other
words, this was a purely business decision and fell within the
scope of the Court's decision in Associated Press.
The only first amendment claim considered by the Lorain
Court was whether the resulting injunction against the newspa-
per would violate the first amendment's guarantee of a free
press.90  The newspaper had argued that the injunction
amounted to a prior restraint on its future actions. The Court
rejected this contention holding that, under the facts of that
case, antitrust law and its remedies applied to the Lorain Jour-
nal as it would to any other business. 1
The government's interest in assuring a competitive busi-
ness environment may not be thwarted by blanket claims of first
85. See Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139 (1969).
86. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
87. Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20 n.18.
88. 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
89. Id. at 154 n.8.
90. Id. at 155-56.
91. Id.
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amendment protection.2 Where no first amendment rights are
exercised, no first amendment protection attaches. The Supreme
Court has consistently recognized the governmental interest in
regulating the business aspects of a newspaper." When that reg-
ulation reaches beyond business, however, it may trod upon pro-
tected speech activity. Should that occur, government should
bear a heavy burden in proving that its interest is sufficient to
warrant the infringement."
D. The Newspaper's Interest
The compelled publication of an advertisement by a news-
paper, in spite of an editorial decision to exclude such advertise-
ments, infringes upon the newspaper's rights of free speech and
free press. First among these are the right of a speaker, any
speaker, to choose the message he will convey." A second inter-
est, the institutional integrity of the press, recognizes the special
function of the press in our constitutional system and protects
92. Another infamous antitrust case involving anticompetitive activity similar to
that present in Lorain, but on an even grander scale, was Kansas City Star Co. v. United
States, 240 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957). The Kansas City
Star Company owned two newspapers, a radio station, and a television station. Although
seven other dailies were published in the area, the two papers owned by Star received 94
percent of the advertising revenue. An extensive list of exclusionary practices was
detailed at trial. Advertisers had been forced to purchase advertising space in all the
Star Company's editions-morning, evening, and Sunday-or not at all. Some advertis-
ers had received notices that they would be dropped if they continued to patronize com-
petitors; others were just dropped without notice. Access to television time was predi-
cated on newspaper advertising. Quotas were set up to divide advertising dollars between
print and broadcasting. A baseball player was even told that he would disappear from
the sports page unless a florist shop he owned stopped advertising with a competitor.
The Star argued that the Sherman Act endangered freedom of the press by subjecting
newspapers to prosecution at the whim of public officials. Id. at 665. The Court of
Appeals, relying on Justice Black's opinion in Associated Press concluded otherwise:
Freedom to print does not mean freedom to destroy. To use the freedom of the
press guaranteed by the First Amendment to destroy competition would defeat
its own ends, for freedom to print news and express opinions as one chooses is
not tantamount to having freedom to monopolize. To monopolize freedom is to
destroy it.
Id. at 666. The Court of Appeals decision resulted in fines of $5,000 against the Star
Company and $2,500 against its advertising editor.
93. See e.g., Citizens Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139 (1969) (anti-
trust law applied to joint operating agreement); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Wall-
ing, 327 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1946) (Fair Labor Standards Act applied to press); Mabee v.
White Plains Publishing, 327 U.S. 178 (1946) (Fair Labor Standards Act); Associated
Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937) (National Labor Relations Act).
94. See infra note 123.
95. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). See infra note 102.
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its independent role as an institution or, more accurately, a
series of institutions.9 6 Institutional integrity encompasses such
concerns as editorial autonomy,91 economic viability," and free-
dom from undue governmental intervention into the operating
and policy decision making functions of the press.9 This is not
to be confused with special rights for the institutional press,100
for the above concerns are as valid when applied to the "lowly
pamphleteer" as to the large institutions.' 10 The interest simply
recognizes that some concerns might apply more uniquely to the
press than to all speakers in general.
Free speech protects the right to choose, as well as to
express, a message.' 0 ' Indeed without the former, the latter is
worth little. Without the right to choose a message, an exercise
of speech may not reflect belief and be no more than a recitation
of a state-created message. Thus, school boards cannot compel
96. See Minneapolis Star v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 103 S. Ct. 1365, 1372
(1983) (state "use tax" on ink and paper impermissably singled out the press for special
treatment in violation of the first amendment).
When the State singles out the press (for differential taxation) ... the politi-
cal constraints that prevent a legislature from passing crippling taxes of gen-
eral applicability are weakened, and the threat of burdensome taxes becomes
acute. That threat can operate as effectively as a censor to check critical com-
ment by the press, undercutting the basic assumption of our political system
that the press will often serve as an important restraint on government.
Id. See also Grosjean v. American Press, 297 U.S. 233 (1935) (discriminatory tax on
newspapers held in violation of the first amendment). "A free press stands as one of the
great interpreters between the government and the people. To allow it to be fettered is
to fetter ourselves." Id. at 250.
97. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258.
98. Minneapolis Star, 103 S. Ct. 1365. Nebraska Press Assoc. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539
(1976); Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241; Grosjean, 297 U.S. 233; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1930).
99. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241.
100. See Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINoS L.J. 631 (1975).
101. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
102. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). In Wooley the Supreme Court
reviewed the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness who removed the state motto, "Live Free
or Die," from his automobile license plate contrary to state law. He claimed that the
motto conflicted with his religious and moral beliefs. The Supreme Court upheld the
three judge District Court and reversed the original conviction holding that the State
may not force an individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideological message.
"[T]he right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state
action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at
all.... The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary
components of the broader concept of 'individual freedom of the mind."' Id. at 714. The
Court went on to use Tornillo as an example of the fundamental right "to decide what to
print or omit." Id. See supra note 75.
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students to salute the flag,108 and a state cannot compel a person
to display a state motto against his will. 1°"
Should a newspaper wish to express a message through its
advertising section, choice is the only mechanism of control it
has. The newspaper creates the message by choosing among the
offered advertisements. One might expect to find advertisements
for sexual liaisons in the Village Voice, but would be shocked to
find the same in the local suburban weekly. These advertise-
ments convey a message which is associated with the newspaper.
They set a tone or an image and can attract or repel readers. If
the choice is removed, so is the message. The right to speak is
effectively denied.
The interest of the press' institutional integrity assumes
that free speech guarantees apply to the press as a whole, and
cannot be parcelled out at varying levels among its functional
units.10 5 Arguably, courts cannot accord a lesser level of protec-
tion to editorial decisions concerning advertising than to similar
decisions concerning the editorial page. 0 6 Otherwise the level of
103. West Virginia State Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1948).
104. Wooley, 430 U.S. 705.
105. See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258.
A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment,
and advertising. The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the deci-
sions made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treat-
ment of public issues and public officials-whether fair or unfair-constitute
the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated
how governmental regulation of the crucial process can be exercised consistent
with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this
time.
Id.; See also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 265-66, where the Court refuses to
accord a lesser level of protection to a message simply because it was contained in an
advertisement. See supra note 35. Cf. Globe Newspaper, 102 S. Ct. at 2613. "The First
Amendment is thus broad enough to encompass those rights that, while not unambigu-
ously enumerated in the very terms of the Amendment, are nonetheless necessary to the
enjoyment of other First Amendment rights." Id.
106. Cf. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 413
U.S. 376 (1973). In Pittsburgh Press a city ordinance prohibiting employment discrimi-
nation was construed as forbidding sex-designated columns in the help wanted section.
The Pittsburgh Press appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court arguing that the decision
violated the first amendment by restricting editorial discretion. The Court ruled that in
this case the combination of placement and the advertisement itself were an "integrated
commercial message." Id. at 388. The advertisements themselves never mentioned gen-
der. Only by their placement in a sex-designated column was it clear that there was a
gender preference. In Home Placement there is no such confluence of placement and
message. The Providence Journal is asserting a right to reject the advertisement because
it does not wish to repeat its message. Moreover, the Journal has a message of its own it
wishes to convey, apart from the message contained in the advertisement. See infra text
accompanying notes 110-11. This separate, severable message was lacking in Pittsburgh
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protection would be determined by the content of the speech
itself.107 As questionable as this practice would be on its face, it
is important to realize that control of the message may be as
important to the institutional* integrity of the press as the mes-
sage itself.108 Decisions concerning content should be made from
within the institution, not from without. 0 9
The difficulty in Home Placement is in determining
whether this was an editorial decision deserving of judicial def-
erence or a simple business decision amenable to reasonable gov-
ernment regulation. In assuming that first amendment rights
were not implicated, the First Circuit apparently viewed the
classified section as no more than a commercial forum in which
the newspaper simply acted as a conduit. To the court, whatever
decisions the newspaper made in this area were necessarily busi-
ness decisions.
The newspaper, on the other hand, claimed to have more
than an economic stake in the messages it conveyed. By choos-
ing its messages, the Journal conveyed a separate message of its
own. It considered Home Placement's advertisements inherently
misleading.110 The editors did not want to repeat them or place
the credibility of the institution behind them. By publishing
their policy for rejecting these advertisements, the editors were
informing their readers that certain standards had to be met
before an advertisement would be printed. In their view, this
made the advertisements which were published more credible."1
It is the very assertion of the first amendment right to con-
vey a message which separates the business from the editorial
decision. It cannot be denied that there are business aspects to
the Journal's decision." 2 Yet, by placing the Journal's editorial
decision in the fixed category of business activity, the First Cir-
cuit used these business aspects to facially invalidate a first
amendment claim. The court recast and judged the Journal's
editorial decision solely in terms of antitrust law. Thus, the
Pres8.
107. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 71-73.
109. See supra note 105.
110. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
111. Id.
112. The fact that an editorial decision or message has a business impact or a profit
motive does not negate first amendment protection. The issue is strictly whether a mes-
sage is involved, not the presence or absence of a business purpose. See supra note 35.
See also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. at 545 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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Journal's exercise of editorial discretion was transformed into
an "apparently paternal judgment" for which "no valid business
reason" existed."' The court essentially reviewed and passed
judgment on the reasonableness of a newspaper's editorial deci-
sion. It used the Sherman Act to dictate the content of a
newspaper.
As a society, we have decided that we do not want govern-
ment regulating the content of speech." 4 "[A]bove all else, the
First Amendment means that government has no power to
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content."" 6 Absent compelling reasons to the con-
trary, editorial decisions are reserved for editors. 116 Government
involvement in the editorial process is simply anathema to the
interests of a free press."17 That involvement is no more palat-
able when directed at advertising.118 Newspapers are institu-
tions. Attacks on a part of that institution can affect the whole.
In Grosjean v. American Press, the Court recognized that eco-
nomic attacks on the institutional viability of the press violated
the first amendment." 9 In Mills v. Alabama'20 it invalidated a
statute resulting in the arrest of a newspaper editor for an edito-
rial printed on election day. In Miami Herald v. Tornillo, it
invalidated a Florida statute granting a right of reply to political
candidates.' 21 These all represent assaults on separate but non-
severable dimensions of the institutional integrity of the press.
The present attack, directed toward editorial policy concerning
the acceptance of advertising, is no less offensive. Liberty in a
multidimensional activity must have breathing space to sur-
vive. 2 To allow government to compel a message, even an
advertisement, takes that space away.
113. Home Placement, 682 F.2d at 277.
114. See supra notes 68, 79-83 and accompanying text.
115. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95.
116. See supra note 105.
117. Prior restraint, the classic prohibition, is in essence a guarantee that editors
alone will decide a newspaper's content. See Near, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). See also
Nebraska Press Assoc., 427 U.S. 539 (1976) "[Alt least in the context of prior restraint
on publication, the decision of what, when, and how to publish is for editors, not judges."
Id. at 613 (Brennan, J., concurring).
118. See supra note 105.
119. Grosjean, 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
120. 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
121. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241.




We must begin by recognizing that first amendment con-
cerns are primary. As important as antitrust legislation is in our
statutory hierarchy, the policies it promotes are not sanctioned
by constitutional right. To overcome this presumption, the state
must prove a compelling interest in regulating the protected
activity.128 In Associated Press, the Supreme Court held that the
Sherman Act applied to business functions of a newspaper. 2 In
Lorain, the Court held that government could use the Sherman
Act to compel a newspaper to publish an advertisement when
the advertisement had been rejected for an anticompetitive pur-
pose.125 Now in Home Placement, the First Circuit has used the
Sherman Act to compel the publication of an advertisement
absent any showing of anticompetitive purpose. This intrusion
into the realm of protected speech ignores the line respected in
the past between the business functions of the press and the
content of the newspaper. The former is protected by the free
press guarantee only to the extent that the institution of the
press is threatened by government action; the latter enjoys more
extensive first amendment protection. The Home Placement
decision would deny the Journal the right to speak through its
own advertising pages under the guise of ordinary business regu-
lation. Such a distinction does violence to the first amendment.
Home Placement is not a case of purposeful anticompetitive
activity. No allegation was made that its declared purpose was
untrue. Whatever anticompetitive effect the Journal's activity
had, it was the indirect result of a newspaper exercising its
rights under the first amendment."' While the government may
123. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
124. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
126. See Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S.
127 (1961). Noerr involved an antitrust claim brought by truckers charging that a rail-
road association had conducted a publicity campaign designed to facilitate the passage of
legislation harmful to the trucking industry. The Court held that the Sherman Act could
not be interpreted to apply to restraints of trade which resulted from legislative action or
to efforts to encourage the passage of such legislation.
[Tihe Sherman Act does not prohibit two or more persons from associating
together in an attempt to persuade the legislature or the executive to take par-
ticular action with respect to a law that would produce a restraint or a monop-
oly. Although such associations could perhaps, through a process of expansive
construction, be brought within the general proscription of "combination(s)
. . in restraint of trade," they bear very little if any resemblance to the com-
binations normally held violative of the Sherman Act. Such a construction of
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at times have a compelling interest in maintaining a competitive
business environment, it did not have a compelling interest in
this case. Anticompetitive effect without more cannot overbal-
ance the exercise of protected press freedoms.12 7 The First Cir-
cuit should have recognized the Journal's right to control its
content and held in its favor.
II. CONCLUSION
Home Placement is an unprecedented extension of antitrust
law into the realm of protected speech. Ignoring the distinction
made in previous decisions between business and editorial func-
tions, the First Circuit Court of Appeals used the Sherman Act
to review and overturn an editorial decision. The decision effec-
tively allowed government to regulate the content of classified
advertising. Since the opinion never referred to the first amend-
ment, it is impossible to know the court's exact position on the
constitutional issues. It is only clear that the major import of
this decision will be in regard to the issues it never addressed.
Robert J. Curran
the Sherman Act would raise important constitutional questions. The right of
petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot,
of course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms.
Id. at 136-38.
127. It should be noted that the situation in Home Placement is easily duplicated.
An adult theater operator can run advertisements between features and qualify as a
newspaper's competitor. A newspaper which rejected the theater's advertisements would
run a serious risk of violating antitrust law. Although in the past, antitrust violations
have been the relatively rare exception to the rule, see supra text accompanying notes
32-33, this decision threatens to make allegations of such violations much more frequent.
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